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s aIntroduction: Sexually transmitted infections are common causes of morbidity and mortality,
including infertility and certain types of cancer. Alcohol tax increases may decrease sexually
transmitted infection rates overall and differentially across population subgroups by decreasing
alcohol consumption in general and prior to sex, thus decreasing sexual risk taking and sexually
transmitted infection acquisition. This study investigated the effects of a Maryland increase in
alcohol beverage sales tax on statewide gonorrhea and chlamydia rates overall and within age,
gender, and race/ethnicity subpopulations.
Methods: This study used an interrupted time series design, including multiple cross-state
comparisons, to examine the effects of the 2011 alcohol tax increase in Maryland on chlamydia and
gonorrhea cases reported to the U.S. National Notiﬁable Disease Surveillance System for January
2003 to December 2012 (N¼120 repeated monthly observations, analyzed in 2015). Effects were
assessed with BoxJenkins autoregressive moving average models with structural parameters.
Results: After the alcohol-speciﬁc sales tax increase, gonorrhea rates decreased 24% (95% CI¼11%,
37%), resulting in 1,600 fewer statewide gonorrhea cases annually. Cohen’s d indicated a substantial
effect of the tax increase on gonorrhea rates (range across control group models, 1.25 to 1.42).
The study did not ﬁnd evidence of an effect on chlamydia or differential effects across age,
race/ethnicity, or gender subgroups.
Conclusions: Results strengthen the evidence from prior studies of alcohol taxes inﬂuencing
gonorrhea rates and extend health prevention effects from alcohol excise to sales taxes. Alcohol tax
increases may be an efﬁcient strategy for reducing sexually transmitted infections.
(Am J Prev Med 2016;50(3):e73–e80) & 2016 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).IntroductionIn 2008, approximately 110 million incident sexuallytransmitted infections (STIs) occurred in the U.S.1STIs increase the risk of acquiring HIV and cause
other long-term health problems, including cancer (cer-
vical, vaginal, anal, oral, throat, and penile), infertility,
and ectopic pregnancy.2–4 In the U.S., wide race/ethnicity
and age disparities exist. Compared with non-Hispanicepartment of Health Outcomes and Policy, College of
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blacks (two to 22 times) and Hispanics (two times).5–7
Half of STI cases occur among those aged 1524 years.1
Scalable, practical interventions are needed to reduce STI
rates, particularly among minorities and young adults.
There are clearly plausible mechanisms by which
alcohol taxes may decrease population STI rates. Exten-
sive literature demonstrates that increased alcohol taxes
lower alcohol consumption and affect drinking pat-
terns.8,9 Lower alcohol consumption caused by alcohol
tax increases should, on average, translate to lower
alcohol consumption prior to sex, reduced alcohol-
related sexual risk-taking (i.e., sex, unprotected sex, and
casual or new partners), and reduced population-level
STIs.10–15 Additionally, lower alcohol consumption
may reduce population STI rates by inﬂuencing other
alcohol-related STI risk factors (e.g., partner violence,
transactional sex, anal sex).16,17vier Inc. This is an
mmons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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a wide range of alcohol-related morbidity and mortal-
ity.18 A handful of studies suggest alcohol taxes
inﬂuence STIs.19–21 A quasi-experimental study
accounting for temporal trends in STI rates and income
found a 2009 Illinois alcohol excise tax increase
reduced statewide gonorrhea and chlamydia rates.19 A
similarly rigorous evaluation, using ﬁxed effects models
to adjust for temporal STI rate trends, found state beer
and liquor taxes in 19821994 were associated with
lower statewide gonorrhea and syphilis rates.21 Adding
consistency and evidence for another STI, a less
rigorous evaluation found increased state beer taxes
associated with decreased gonorrhea (19812001) and
8-year lagged AIDS rates (19822001).20 Finally, after
accounting for state-level differences, the 1991 federal
beer tax increase was associated with lower nationwide
gonorrhea and syphilis rates.21 For public health and
policy relevance, the link between alcohol tax and STI
rates needs conﬁrmation from additional recent alcohol
tax changes.
Differential responses to increased alcohol taxation
across subpopulations (e.g., age, gender, and race/eth-
nicity) are possible, owing to differing STI rates, beverage
preferences, drinking locations, and price sensitivity.1,5,22
For example, alcohol taxation may have a stronger
inﬂuence on STIs among younger than older adults
because those aged o25 years are more likely to have
STIs and to drink on-trade (i.e., venues where they may
meet new sex partners).22 Similarly, alcohol taxation may
have a stronger inﬂuence on STI rates among women
than men because women appear more sensitive to
alcohol price changes.22 The few studies considering
differing effects of alcohol taxes on alcohol-related health
outcomes across subpopulations show conﬂicting
results.19,20,23
To increase understanding of the inﬂuence of alcohol
tax increases on STI rates, this study investigated the
effects of a 2011 alcohol-speciﬁc sales tax increase in
Maryland on statewide gonorrhea and chlamydia rates
overall and across age, gender, and race/ethnicity sub-
groups. The Maryland case is noteworthy for two
reasons9,18: (1) the 50% tax rate increase is large
compared with typical tax adjustments and (2) the sales
tax change is a different tax mechanism than excise taxes
evaluated in most previous studies.
Tax mechanisms inﬂuence whether taxes are included
in the posted price (excise taxes) or added at the cash
register (sales taxes) and potentially affect the salience to
and behavior of consumers.24 Gonorrhea and chlamydia
are required to be reported nationally (resulting in
quality measurement), have a relatively high incidence
compared with other STIs (increasing statistical power),and have a lag time of 23 weeks between acquisition
and symptoms (decreasing the time between exposure
and diagnosis).29,25 Because the same behaviors lead to
many STIs, observed alcohol tax policy effects on well-
measured gonorrhea and chlamydia rates are likely
applicable to other STIs, including HIV.Methods
Design and Sample
In 2015, the authors used an interrupted time series quasi-
experimental design to examine the effect of a July 2011
Maryland alcohol sales tax increase on gonorrhea and chlamy-
dia rates. Gonorrhea and chlamydia cases were obtained from
the National Notiﬁable Disease Surveillance System for avail-
able months: January 2003 to December 2012—102 months
prior to and 18 months following the alcohol tax increase. To
account for possible effects of unmeasured factors affecting STI
rates, three control groups were considered: (1) a multistate
comparison group; (2) a similarity-based control; and (3) a
regional control.
For the multistate comparison group, the authors chose all of
the 48 U.S. contiguous states that did not: (1) have alcohol tax
changes during the study period; (2) share a geographic border
with Maryland to avoid potential bias from residents avoiding
the tax increase by purchasing alcohol in an adjacent state; and
(3) have a government monopoly system for sales of any major
alcoholic beverage type.
Government monopoly systems have a fundamentally different
deﬁnition of alcohol tax because state Alcoholic Beverage Control
administrators can change prices at will and such changes are not
included in legislated taxes. The multistate comparison group
included California, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Wisconsin,
New Mexico, Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, Florida, and Rhode Island.
Within the multistate comparison group, the authors selected
similarity-based states as states with the most similar baseline
gonorrhea and chlamydia series using an integrated periodogram
dissimilarity index (Colorado for gonorrhea and Oklahoma for
chlamydia).26,27 To adjust for possible regional variations, Rhode
Island was selected—the only state in the northeast U.S. meeting
the comparison criteria.Maryland Alcohol Taxes
Maryland imposes an excise tax on businesses engaged in
manufacturing or wholesaling alcoholic beverages.28 Tax rates
have been stable since 1972 for beer and wine and since 1955 for
distilled spirits. Maryland counties and municipalities may not
impose alcoholic beverage taxes.28
Maryland levies a general sales tax on the retail sale of tangible
personal property, including alcoholic beverages.29 From January
1, 1989 to June 30, 2008, the general sales tax rate was 5%.30
Effective July 1, 2008, the rate increased to 6% and remained at that
rate until July 1, 2011.31 Effective July 1, 2011, Maryland increased
the sales tax rate for alcoholic beverages to 9%.32 Sales tax rates for
all other tangible personal property remained at 6%.www.ajpmonline.org
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The authors obtained all available months (January 2003 through
December 2012) of state-level STI counts.33 STI counts were
available separately by race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, non-
Hispanic black, Hispanic, American Indian or American Native,
Asian or Paciﬁc Islander, and unknown), age (1519, 2024,
2529, andZ30 years), and gender. To control for differences in
population size between race/ethnicity, age, and gender subgroups
within Maryland and between Maryland and comparison groups,
monthly STI rates were calculated overall and for each subgroup
with estimated population sizes.34,35Statistical Analysis
To account for potential autocorrelations of STI rates over time
within Maryland, including potential seasonality, BoxJenkins
autoregressive moving average (ARIMA) models with structural
parameters were run in SAS, version 9.3. Gonorrhea and chlamy-
dia were considered independent STIs. Thus, for each STI, the
overall population-level effect was estimated with the following
form:
Yt¼b0þb1nGenTaxtþb2nAlcTaxtþb3nXtþARIMA noise model
Yt represents the Maryland STI rate (cases per 100,000) at month
t. GenTaxt indicates the July 2008 general sales tax increase in
month t. The authors did not consider the general sales tax change
an important predictor because the 1% increase applied to all
products, and thus is not expected to cause a shift in purchasing
from alcohol to other products. AlcTaxt is an indicator for the July
2011 alcohol-speciﬁc sales tax increase in month t. Xt is the
control group STI rate in month t. Following accounting for the
ARIMA noise model form (1,0,0)(1,0,0)12, visual inspection of
residual autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions
demonstrated adequate ﬁt. Noise model residuals were indistin-
guishable from white noise up to the 24th lag (BoxLjung test).
The authors assumed stationary data (augmented DickeyFuller
po0.0001) and normally distributed residuals (mean events per
month Z20).
Four models were estimated for each STI: unadjusted, adjusted
for the multistate control, adjusted for the similarity-based control,
and adjusted for the regional control. All parameter estimates were
converted into percentage change (relative to baseline period series
mean) and Cohen’s d (estimated with the baseline period
series SD).
The authors performed two additional sensitivity analyses to
assess ﬁnding robustness. To assess the inﬂuence of parametric
decisions, STI counts and log-transformed rates were used as the
outcome. To assess the inﬂuence of the early baseline period years,
models were restricted to the most recent 36 months (18 months
pre and post tax change).
To assess whether the alcohol sales tax increase affected
subgroups differentially, a pooled time series approach was used
with the arima() and lrtest() functions in R, version 3.1.3.36
Subgroup time series were linked together in a single super-
vector. Dummy variables distinguished subgroups and represented
the group-speciﬁc tax effects. Differential effects were tested across
subgroups with likelihood ratio tests. An ARIMA noise model of
the form (5,0,0)(0,0,0)12 was used because it can approximate a
large number of underlying ARIMA models, ﬁnd a sufﬁcientMarch 2016correlation structure for the whole super series, and likely produces
accurate effect estimates when subgroup variability causes mis-
speciﬁcation.37–39Results
In Maryland, monthly gonorrhea rates ranged from six to
15 cases per 100,000 population, with a mean of 11 cases
per 100,000 per month before the tax increase (January
2003 to June 2011) and from six to 12 cases per 100,000,
with a mean of nine cases per 100,000 per month
following the tax increase (July 2011 to December 2012)
(Figure 1). Prior to the tax increase in Maryland,
gonorrhea rates in the multistate control group ranged
from six to 11 cases per 100,000 population, with a mean
of nine cases per 100,000 (Figure 1A). Visual inspection
suggests that prior to the tax increase, gonorrhea rates in
Maryland were higher than rates in the similarity-based
and regional controls (Figure 1B and 1C). Following the
tax change, the gonorrhea rate appears to decrease in
Maryland and not among the three control groups. The
ﬁgure is included to visually observe the monthly gonor-
rhea rates before and after the tax change, but interpre-
tation should be limited to ARIMA modeling results.
Following the 2011 Maryland alcohol tax increase, a
signiﬁcant reduction in gonorrhea infections was found
regardless of the control group (pr0.001) (Table 1).
Controlling for changes in the multistate comparison
group, the Maryland tax increase reduced the number of
diagnosed gonorrhea infections by 2.6 per month per
100,000 people—equivalent to nearly 1,600 fewer cases
per year. Gonorrhea cases were reduced by 24% with a
large intervention effect (Cohen’s d¼1.43). Effect esti-
mates were similar when the similarity-based control, the
regional control, and no adjustment were used (Table 1).
Sensitivity analyses produced little or no change in the
estimated effect of the alcohol tax increase on gonorrhea
rates. Effect estimates for counts and log-transformed
rates were similar. Restricting the baseline period to the
18 months prior to the tax change resulted in marginally
higher effect estimates. There was no difference in the
effects of the Maryland alcohol sales tax for gonorrhea
across race/ethnicity, age, and gender subgroups. The
2008 general sales tax was not associated with gonorrhea
rates.
In Maryland, monthly chlamydia rates ranged from 12
to 69 cases per 100,000, with a mean of 35 cases per
100,000 per month before the tax increase (January 2003
to June 2011) and from 23 to 52, with a mean of 39 cases
per 100,000 per month following the tax increase
(July 2011 to December 2012) (Figure 2). Compared
with the gonorrhea series (Figure 1), the chlamydia rate
series were more similar between Maryland and each
Figure 1. Monthly gonorrhea rates in Maryland and comparison groups from 2003 to 2012.
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rates appeared to increase similarly across time.
Regardless of the control group that was considered,
results showed no signiﬁcant changes in chlamydia cases
following the tax increase overall (Table 1) or within
subgroups. Similar null results were found with count
and log-transformed rate outcomes. When restricting the
baseline period to the 18 months prior to the tax change,
chlamydia rates decreased 5.5 cases per 100,000 people
per month in Maryland compared with the multistate
control group (p¼0.03). The 2008 general sales tax was
not associated with chlamydia rates in any model.
Discussion
A 2011 Maryland 50% increase in alcohol-speciﬁc sales
tax decreased statewide gonorrhea rates by an estimated24%—preventing nearly 1,600 gonorrhea cases annually.
Findings are consistent with the few previous studies
showing decreased STIs with increased alcohol taxes.19–21
State-level alcohol policies may be one answer to
the national call for interventions, with potential to
substantially reduce population-wide STI rates, possibly
including HIV.
The observed effect of the Maryland alcohol tax
strengthens evidence of an effect of alcohol taxes on
gonorrhea rates by providing a more recent and robust
analysis, and expanding the literature from excise to sales
tax effects.19–21 It remains difﬁcult to compare the
magnitude of tax effects across studies because of
numerous tax nuances, including mechanism (percent-
age versus cents per gallon), differing baseline tax rates,
and size of legislated changes, as well as differences in STI
rates across states. Given such cross-state differences andwww.ajpmonline.org
Table 1. Effects of Maryland 2011 Alcohol Sales Tax Increase Adjusting for Various Comparison Groups
Change in rate per 100,000
individuals per month (SE) p-value % Change (95% CI) Cohen’s d
Effect of alcohol tax increase on gonorrhea
Unadjusted 2.3 (0.6) o0.001 21.8 (33.1, 10.5) 1.28
Adjusted for multi-state controla 2.6 (0.7) o0.001 24.3 (37.0, 11.5) 1.42
Adjusted for similarity-based controlb 2.3 (0.6) o0.001 21.3 (33.0, 9.7) 1.25
Adjusted for regional controlc 2.6 (0.5) o0.001 26.7 (33.5, 13.9) 1.39
Effect of alcohol tax increase on chlamydia
Unadjusted 2.0 (2.6) 0.452 6.0 (21.7, 9.6) 0.25
Adjusted for multi-state control 2.0 (2.6) 0.434 6.3 (21.9, 9.3) 0.26
Adjusted for similarity based control 1.9 (2.6) 0.461 6.0 (21.7, 9.8) 0.25
Adjusted for regional control 2.7 (2.6) 0.304 8.4 (24.2, 7.5) 0.35
Note: Boldface indicates statistical signiﬁcance (po0.05).
aAll of the 48 U.S. contiguous states that did not: (1) have alcohol tax changes during the study period, (2) share a geographic border with Maryland,
and (3) have a government monopoly system for sales of any major alcoholic beverage type. California, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Wisconsin, New
Mexico, Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Florida, and Rhode Island.
bColorado for gonorrhea and Oklahoma for chlamydia. Selected with an integrated periodogram dissimilarity index to detect the most similar baseline
gonorrhea and chlamydia series.
cRhode Island, the only state in the northeast U.S. not excluded based on the criteria listed above for multi-state control.
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U.S. state alcohol sales rather than excise tax change, it is
unclear whether the ﬁndings are consistent with sugges-
tions that sales taxes are less salient to consumers.24 But,
at least in Maryland, alcohol sales taxes have beneﬁcial
health effects similar to those of excise taxes.
Two differences between gonorrhea and chlamydia
may explain the ﬁndings of an effect of the alcohol tax on
gonorrhea and not chlamydia. First, compared with
chlamydia cases, gonorrhea cases are typically more
geographically concentrated and restricted to higher-risk
populations (e.g., high levels of sexual mixing, concurrent
partners).40,41 Thus, a population-based intervention
might inﬂuence the population rate of gonorrhea quicker
than chlamydia. Second, the outcome data may be less
sensitive to changes in chlamydia than gonorrhea. Sur-
veillance data are more likely to under-represent chlamy-
dia than gonorrhea infections because chlamydia-infected
individuals are less likely to seek testing, owing to an
increased probability of asymptomatic or mild infections
and a lack of chlamydia partner-notiﬁcation services.1,42
When considered with other studies,19,23 the present
ﬁndings of nondifferential effects across subgroups
suggest alcohol tax effects on alcohol-related morbidity
and mortality across subpopulations are complex.
For example, the apparent contrast between this study
and the most similar previous study (showing larger tax
effects on STI rates among younger and minority
populations in Illinois) may be explained by differencesMarch 2016in the alcohol taxes and base populations.19 First, the
alcohol taxes were different—across beverage types,
Maryland increased sales tax proportionately, but Illinois
increased excise tax differentially. A disproportionate tax
increase would create subgroup differences in effects by
beverage preferences.22 For example, some subgroups
tend to prefer beer, others spirits. A legislated tax change
that increases the beer tax a tiny amount but increases the
spirits tax a large amount is more likely to induce
subgroup differences in effects. Second, the base popula-
tions were different—baseline STI rates and mean
incomes (inﬂuencing discretionary income and alcohol
purchasing) across racial/ethnic groups were more similar
in Maryland than in Illinois prior to the tax changes.43,44
These ﬁndings add to the mounting evidence that
alcohol tax increases appear to be efﬁcient structural
intervention for STIs, especially STIs in concentrated or
high-risk populations like gonorrhea and HIV. The only
structural intervention promoted by CDC is condom
distribution.45 The observed alcohol tax effects (24%
decrease in gonorrhea) are similar to effects of condom
distribution (23%–30% decrease).46 Moreover, condom
distribution programs cost, whereas alcohol taxes gen-
erate revenues.
Limitations
This study has three important limitations. First, like all
nonrandomized policy interventions, this study did not
have a randomly assigned control group. Thus, the true
Figure 2. Monthly chlamydia rates in Maryland and comparison groups from 2003 to 2012.
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limitation by comparing to states with similar alcohol pricing
regulations, considering three control groups, and eliminat-
ing some competing explanations (i.e., around the time of the
tax change, Maryland did not change STI diagnostics or
conduct STI prevention campaigns; E Liebow, Maryland
Department of Health and G Olthoff, Baltimore Health
Department, unpublished observations, 2014). Second,
owing to the time lag for available STI data, the authors
were only able to assess short-term tax effects. Third, STI
rates were obtained from surveillance data, which is suscep-
tible to under-reporting (e.g., through providers’ failure to
report and undiagnosed infections). Under-reporting is
unlikely to be differential by the alcohol tax increase; thus,
any potential bias is anticipated to be toward the null.
Strengths
This study has three important strengths. First, it used a
quasi-experimental controlled time-series design: an
experimental design producing conﬁdent causalconclusions.47,48 Second, the long time series (10 years of
continual monthly data) allowed for good characterization
of STI patterns over time. Third, demonstrating effects of
the few recent alcohol tax increases, especially a sales tax,
has important practical utility in guiding policymakers on
the health beneﬁts of potential tax changes.Conclusions
An increase in alcohol retail cost of $0.03 per $1.00
appears to have decreased gonorrhea infections in Mary-
land. During the 1.5-year examined post period, an
estimated 2,400 cases of gonorrhea were prevented,
saving an estimated $519,600 in direct medical expenses
(in 2010 U.S. dollars).49 Even more-dramatic reductions
in suffering and health costs would likely be seen
if alcohol tax increases were more similar to the ﬁve
times higher 2008 Maryland tobacco tax increase.50,51
Although increased research on STI reductions following
alcohol tax increases of various types and magnitudes iswww.ajpmonline.org
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alcohol tax increases reduce gonorrhea incidence.19–21
Moreover, this evidence for STIs is consistent with the
much larger literature on other diseases and injuries
demonstrating beneﬁcial population health effects of
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